Abstract: This paper investigates the effect of ERP system implementations on agency cost in the introducing period in China. The research reveals that, for the listed companies, the agency cost after implementing the ERP System will reduce significantly; however, compared with the nonState-Owned Enterprise, the agency cost of the State-Owned Enterprise reduced less after implementing the ERP system. 
I Introduction

This thesis researches the impact of the ERP (Enterprise Resource
. This report reflects from one side that more and more enterprises in China accept the ERP system. They expect to improve the management level through increasing IT investment and then further improve the business performance and competitiveness (Ma et al., 2004) . Jensen and Meckling(1976) hold that when the management fails to be the complete owner of an enterprise, information asymmetry will exist between the owner and the management, which will lead to the fact that the management will maximize personal interests in their decision-making.
In order to supervise the management and control the conflicts, the owners will need to establish contracts with the management, and thus the problems of agency appear. Such information asymmetry gives rise to two agency problems: one is ex anti adverse selection, and the other is ex post moral hazard. The ex post moral hazard has two agency models, that is, the hidden action moral hazard and the hidden information moral hazard, where the former refers to the fact that the results of an agent's behavior can be observed while the motives cannot be verified; the latter indicates that the agent has relative information advantage upon what is commissioned, which may lead to opportunistic behaviors of the agent, and the results of such behaviors can be observed and also tested (Arrow,1985) .
The managers shall increase his information so as to reduce or even eliminate the moral hazard problems caused by information asymmetry and which can be improved through the following two methods, one is that the party with private information inform the party with public information; the other is that the party without private information have a way to make the party with private information disclose actively it private information (Spence and Zeckhauser, 1971) . A precondition to both methods of increasing the information is that the agent shall have sufficient and comprehensive information on enterprise operations, otherwise the agent will be in a predicament of "to make bricks without straw", which is of no help for resolving the agency problems. For the agents, in order to possess or access easier to the operational information of an enterprise, the adoption of information technology is one of the most important approaches in modern enterprises. Information technologies gain rapid popularity in modern enterprise, for example, the information technologies especially those embedded management thinking and internal control principles are widely integrated into the enterprises' daily operations, of which the best representative will be the ERP system. Through the implementation of the ERP system enterprises can achieve: firstly, the agent can timely access to the complete information on business operations, hence reduce the agency costs between the management and the general employees; secondly, it will become more simple and quick if the management need to send the information on business operations to the owners, so that owners can receive timely information on business operations and adjust in time the contracts with the management, and hence reduce the agency costs; Thirdly, because the ERP system preserved the operation information of an enterprise, the managers can easily obtain the information on business operations through a certain ways, such as regularly via the application subsystems that provided by the ERP, and which will consequently reduce the supervision costs of the management for the owner, namely, the agency costs will be reduced; Fourthly, the ERP system is based on technology and relatively complex, therefore, such opportunistic behaviors as manipulating financial data etc. become increasingly difficult for the management, thus reduce the moral hazard of hidden information; Fifthly, as the above four advantages can be achieved when implementing the ERP system, the implementation of the ERP system was granted a signal function, which represent the actively expressed goodwill by the management to the owners; furthermore, which also make it convenient for the owner to seek the business operations information and reduce the costs. Therefore, the implementation of ERP systems can reduce the agency costs caused by adverse selection.
In short, through implementing the ERP system, business operations will become more transparent than before, which means that more and more information on business operations, such as financial information and the internal control information, etc. is processed and optimized by the ERP system. Therefore it can not only reduce the agency costs between the management and the general employees, but also reduce the costs of supervising and controlling of the management for the owner, which further optimize the agency costs, namely, the agency costs can be minimized.
Based on the above analysis, the following questions will be naturally asked: what is the impact of ERP system implementation for China's listed companies and how much does it affect? Does ERP system implementation represent agency costs reduction? Does it mean that the ERP implementation can reduce some of the disadvantages of modern enterprises if the agency costs really reduced? If the ERP implementation failed to reduce the agency costs, it means that the investors and the policy makers need to re-examine the negative impacts of information technology.
To better answer these questions, this paper examined the impact of ERP implementation on agency costs of China's listed companies in ERP introducing period under the guidance of "to stimulate industrialization with information technologies" strategy in China. The reason why the ERP introducing period was selected as a sample is that if ERP implementation have ideal effect in the introducing period, then ERP system implementation after this period should be more conducive to China's capital market development. Based on this, this study shows that the agency costs of the company which implemented ERP systems will be significantly reduced; however, compared with the non-state-owned holding companies, the agency costs of the State-Owned Enterprisereduced less after implementing the ERP systems.
The main contributions of this paper is: firstly, from the perspective of information technology, it investigated the factors affecting the agency costs, enriched the literatures on agency costs and provided a new analysis perspective and interpretation to the information content of the ERP system in China's capital market; secondly, this study provided a reference for ERP system selection and upgrading for the companies; thirdly, it provided an empirical evidence for audit quality improvement or regulatory policy-making. For the external auditors, when auditing the enterprises that implementing the ERP business, the potential problems of the agency costs that caused by the ERP system need to be considered.
The paper is organized as follows: The second part is theoretical analysis and literature review; the third part is research hypotheses and model specification; the fourth part is sample selection and descriptive statistics; the fifth part is the sample results; the sixth part is research conclusions and limitation.
II Theoretical analysis and literature review
According to the research conclusions of Jensen and Meckling(1976) , Arrow(1985) and Spence and Zeckhauser(1971) , agency costs is the function used to describe the conflict of interest due to asymmetric information in the principal-agent relationship; the asymmetric information led to ex ante adverse selection and ex post moral hazards, where the moral hazards can be divided into the hidden behavior and the hidden information. Based on this the paper proposed Model (a) as follows: system implementation played a signal role, and also reduced the costs of seeking the business operations information for the principal, and therefore, ERP system implementation can affect the adverse selection in Model (a), that is, ERP system implementation is the function of adverse selection; secondly, through implementing the ERP system, the business operations of an enterprise can be completely preserved and every detail of the information can be known, so that the information including the decision-making behavior of the management and the work processes etc. can be tracked. therefore, the moral hazard of hidden behavior of "the results can be observed but not confirmed" can be avoided to a certain extent, that is, ERP system implementation is the function of the moral hazard of hidden behavior; thirdly, the trustor can easily access to the business operation information that preserved in the ERP system, and hence reduced the supervision costs of measuring and controlling the management for the owner. As the ERP system made the opportunistic behavior more difficult for the management, therefore it can affect the moral hazard of hidden information, that is, ERP system implementation is the function of the moral hazard of hidden information.
Based on the above analysis, Model (a) can be simplified to Model (b) as follows:
is the agency cost function of Model (a) when implementing the ERP system, of which, "ERP" indicates whether the ERP system is implemented or not and "Others" is other factors such as equity structure etc. that affect the agency costs. If there is no implementation of the ERP system, then model (b) is completely equivalent to model (a). In this paper, model (b) was used as a basis for analysis due to the fact that ERP system implementation is mainly concerned.
Since the late 1990s, with the rapid development of information technology, especially ERP system implementation, provides a great convenience for the supervision behavior of the management. Firstly, ERP implementation makes the business operations of the enterprises more transparent, which means that more and more information concerning business operations, such as the financial information and the supply chain information are processed through ERP and other information technologies. the supervision costs of the management can be minimized, thus the agency costs of management and the staff also can be minimized. In the late 1990s, 70% of the Fortune 1000 companies have implemented or were implementing the ERP system (Cerullo and Cerullo, 2000) . Implementation of ERP systems is one of the important reasons that made these companies excel in fierce competition (Winters, 2004) . ERP system implementation possesses information content in capital market, which combined the implementation of ERP system with the improvement of an enterprise's operation performance (Hunton et al.,2002) . Researches by Hunton et al. revealed that after knowing the announcement of implementing ERP by an enterprise, the analysts will modify the existing surplus forecast to increase the future earnings forecast level of this enterprise (Hunton et al.,2002) . These documents only took the ERP implementation as a signaling mechanism, and they failed to investigate how ERP implementation will affect the signaling mechanism. ERP implementation means that the management is trying to improve the existing management system of an enterprise, that the management is sending private information to the owners who do not have the business operation information, which reduces the moral risks and the agency costs to some extent.
Fama and Jensen found that, due to the separation of management and ownership, the managers will no longer have residual claims for an enterprise's assets and they do not bear the risks of business failure. For this reason, the rational managers will not take maximum profits of the enterprise as their pursuit; however, they turn to pursue the maximization of the individual utility (Fama and Jensen,1983) . Barnea et al. (1980) insist that information asymmetry is caused by the fact that the management has more private information on business operations that the investors do not possess, which lead to the cognitive biases of business operation between both parties. Such cognitive bias may be improved with the implementation of information technologies (Barnea et al. ,1980) .The implementation of ERP systems can reduce the problems of poor information exchanges between various departments in an enterprise, which will improve the company's transparency, speed up the information flow and help to make the information more transparent. ERP systems can effectively collect accurate information timely for those who need, which facilitate the complete control of company's financial position for the management, and thereby effectively improved the decision-making quality of the management (Davenport, 1998) .
Ang et al. holds that agency cost will increase when the number of the managers increases who do not have shares of the enterprise (Ang et al., 2000) . With the increase of the shareholders, the "free riding" problem will weaken the incentive of supervision of the shareholders; the agency cost and ownership share of the managers are negatively correlated; agency costs will also rise with the increase of the non-management shareholders; with external supervision effect, banks can promote the decrease of the agency costs.
As for the ERP system implementation, on one hand, it provides a convenient computer software tool for the supervising management from the board of directors, the board of supervisors, the internal audit and external audit bodies, which facilitates the access to the company's operation information; on the other hand, it also reduce the information asymmetry between the management and the subordinates/employees. The two aspects reduce the information asymmetry between the management and the principal and also that between the users of the financial reports and the management. The reduction in information asymmetry leads to the supervision cost reduction between the management and the principal, and consequently, disclosing the information related to the implementation of ERP systems in the financial statements can bring with positive excess return for the company (Hayes et al., 2001 ).
In summary, the existing researches focus on the implementation of ERP systems as signaling mechanisms which have information contents in the capital markets. However, the literatures rarely examine the mechanism behind the ERP system implementation, especially its impact on the company agency costs, in particular, under China's special institutional systems, what effect will ERP implementation have on the agency costs of the State-Owned Enterprise within three years of the implementation and three years later. This thesis examined the impact of ERP system implementation on the agency costs of China's listed companies from the perspective of agency costs. Commission, provides that "companies should strengthen internal controls using information technology, establish information systems being compatible with the operation and management and promote the dynamic integration of the internal control processes and the information systems, so as to achieve the automatic control of the business and matters and reduce or eliminate manipulation. " The Basic Standards for Enterprise Internal Control aims at increasing the information flow and transparency to achieve the goal of strengthening internal controls taking advantages of processing information with information technology within the enterprises. These laws and regulations attempt to ensure the authenticity and effective flow of the internal information through some methods, allowing the investors to effectively access to the enterprises' internal information and reduce the information asymmetry between the management and the arising agency costs. To achieve these objectives, the information technology is among the currently available and more feasible means, and the implementation of ERP is an effective one because the internal control can be embedded in the ERP system.
III Research Hypotheses and Model Specification
Through implementing the ERP system in enterprises, the business and the financial information can realize real-time correspondence, and the business-related operation information can be obtained easily; correspondingly the Audit Committee will be able to supervise the implementation of the companies' internal audit system and internal control system, and examine the financial information and its disclosure more effectively than before. These facilitate the connection of the internal and the external audits and reduce the manipulation, which improves the authenticity and reliability of the information released to the market.
Therefore, for the listed companies that implemented the ERP system, they can embed ideas and concepts being more suitable for the management, which further standardizes and optimizes the business processes; in this way, it makes the business information flow and the financial information flow being consistent, reduces the agency costs and improves the company's agency efficiency.
In addition, for an enterprise, the ERP systems are not just large-scale and long-term investment projects, they also mean the changes of the corporate management ideas and concepts.
However, for a company's existing corporate culture, any changes in management ideas and concepts is a kind of sub-location and the company must go through a period of painful adaptation period. This painful process is a period that the company makes self-adjustment and self-adaptation, and a period that the new management concepts gradually growing in the company. In this process, the companies need to re-plan their business processes to use the resources and information more effectively. the company's agency efficiency is also being improved gradually. Meanwhile, in order to manage and supervise more effectively, the management needs to restructure the businesses when implementing the ERP to improve the transparency of the businesses within the company and between the company and the external suppliers and customers. Thus, the company's agency costs are reduced and the agency efficiency improved.
Based on the above analysis, the hypothesis H1 is raised as follows:
H1: for companies implementing the ERP systems, the agency costs dropped significantly. Committee of the Communist Party of China put forward that: "to vigorously promote the economic and social informatization is an strategic measure that covers the overall modernization.
To stimulate industrialization and achieve leapfrog development of social productive forces using information technology." After "the state-owned enterprises establishing the modern enterprise information technology with industrialization". The main idea of the above guidelines is to achieve the strategic objective of "to stimulate industrialization using information technology". To achieve this strategic goal, all provinces and municipalities in China actively introduced relevant policies and made sample enterprises of ERP implementation. Among these, the state-owned enterprises benefit most from this undoubtedly.
When the strategic objective of "to stimulate industrialization using information technology" was proposed, the state-owned enterprises as state-holding companies must be preferred to realize this strategy, and it has been a political task for the state-owned enterprises. Information technology has been a way of realizing state-owned enterprise reform. When being pushed by external forces, incented by interest subsidies and pressed by the supervising assessment, the state-owned enterprises promoted the implementation of ERP blindly; and even more, some of them implemented ERP just for getting the subsidies and passing the examination. For many state-owned enterprises, the implementation of ERP has become one of the political goals: they want to meet the supervising assessment requirements or even to stand out in the information technology process, and the management just consider their own political future. Under such circumstances, ERP is likely to face many problems. In short, for the state-owned enterprises, their intentions in the implementation of ERP are impure at the beginning and they do not simply want to improve the management level by ERP; however, more often they hastily implemented unrealistically and are motivated by following suit by other unknown motives.
In brief, for the state-controlled listed companies, they are more policy-oriented in implementing the ERP systems than considering improving the operational efficiency. In this context, compared with the private enterprises, the results of ERP implementation for the state-controlled listed companies are worse. Based on this, the thesis proposes the following hypothesis H2:
H2: Compared with the non-state-owned holding companies, the agency costs of the
State-Owned Enterprise implementing the ERP systems dropped less.
According to the definition of agency problems by Jensen and Meckling(1976) , Ang et al. (2000) pointed out that to measure the agency costs, one can measure the cost differences between a company that had agency problems and a similar company had no such problems. According to this idea, they measured the agency costs in two ways: Firstly, the ratio of the operating expenses and the sales. Secondly, to examine the extent of effective use of the assets by the managers using the total assets turnover; when the ration of the management expenses and the sales of a company is higher, or the total assets turnover is lower, it indicates that the company's agency costs are higher. Based on the approach by Luo Wei, Zhu Chunyan(2010), two measuring indicators for the agency costs, Mfee Ratio and Turn Over Rate, were obtained after making the annual industry median adjustment to the management fee ratio and the total assets turnover.
To test the above hypothesis, the thesis uses the following Model (1) 
（1）
The definitions of the variables in Model (1) are as shown in Table 1 . Of which, Agency is the two indicators measuring the corporate agency costs, including: the management fee ratio after making the annual industry median adjustment (Mfee Ratio) and the total turnover rate (Turn Over Rate). The definitions of other variables in Model (1) are as shown in Table 1 . 
Variable Description
MfeeRatio
The management fee ratio, which is the ration of the management fees and the gross trading income and is adjusted by the annual industry median.
TurnOverRate
The total asset turnover, which is the ratio of the gross trading income and total assets and is adjusted by the annual industry median.
ERP
Whether implementing the ERP systems or not, "yes" is "1", "no" is "0".
AuditCommitte
Whether the company has set up an audit committee or not, "yes" is "1", "no" is "0".
hasTwo21
Whether the chairman of the board and the general manager is the same person or not, "yes" is "1", "no" is "0".
State
Whether the last controlling shareholder of the largest shareholder of the listed companies is the state-owned holding company or not, "yes" is "1", "no" is "0".
DirectorSize
Director size, the number of the board members.
InsideRatio
Executives stake, the total number of shares owned by executives of the total capital ratio indepRatio Ratio of the independent directors, which is the ratio of the independent directors and the total number of the directors.
Balance
Share balance degree, the ratio between the ratio sum from the second to the fifth stake shareholders and the largest shareholder.
CR5Index CR5-index, the sum of the shareholding ratios of the five largest shareholders and Zindex Z-index, the ratio of the shareholding ratios between the largest shareholder and the second largest one.
LongDebtRatio Long-term debt ratio, which is the ratio of the long-term debt to the total assets. lnsize Company size, the natural logarithm of the total assets growth Growth, the growth rate of the company's revenue of the year.
ROA Return on total assets, which is the ratio of the net profits to the total assets.
Leverage
Financial Leverage, which is the ratio of the total debts to the total assets.
IV Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
The Table 2 reports the sample descriptive statistics. After annual industry adjustment, the mean of the agency efficiency (TurnOverRate) is 0.099, the median is 0, the maximum and minimum values are 1.986 and -0.686 respectively, which indicates that the overall agency efficiency of the sample companies' is not high, and the agency efficiency difference is too large for each company.
After annual industry adjustment and winsorize process, the mean of the agency costs (MfeeRate) is 0.096, the median is 0, the maximum and minimum values are 3.7170 and -0.1071 respectively, which indicates that the overall agency costs of the sample companies' is relatively high, and the agency costs difference is relatively large for each company. The mean of the sample companies' long-term debt ratios (LongDebtRatio) is 0.064, the maximum and minimum values are 0.421 and 0, which indicates that the samples' long-term debt ratios are quite different. Similarly, the mean of the growth rates of the sample companies (growth) is 0.217, the maximum and minimum values are 3.601 and -0.825, which indicates that the growth rates of the samples are also quite different.
The mean of the ratios of the shareholding proportion between the largest shareholder and the second largest one of the samples (Zindex) is 37.023, the median is 5.612, the maximum and minimum values are 553.119 and 1.021, indicating that the ownership structures of the sample companies are different, which fully shows that the ownership structures of some companies are irrational to a certain degree.
The lower left corner of Table 3 correlation coefficient table and the Spearman correlation coefficient table, the agency efficiency (TurnOverRate) has significant positive correlation with whether implementing ERP (ERP) or not, while the agency cost (MfeeRate) has significant negative correlation with whether implementing ERP (ERP) or not. Notes: *** Two-tailed p<1%; ** Two-tailed p<5%; * Two-tailed p<10%
V Sample Results
(1) The regression results Table 4 reports two variables to measure the agency costs of the listed companies in Model
(1): the regression results of the management fee ratio and the total assets turnover. The dependent variable for Model 1 and Model 2 is the management fee ratio (MfeeRate), the dependent variable for Model 3 and Model 4 is the total assets turnover (TurnOverRate).
Let's examine the models with management fee ratio (MfeeRate) as the dependent variable.
In Model 1, the coefficient indicating whether the sample companies implemented the ERP (ERP)
or not is negative clearly, which demonstrates that if a listed company implemented ERP, its agency costs will drop, that is, the implementation of ERP helps the listed companies reduce the agency costs, and thus H1 is tested. In Model 2, the coefficient indicating whether the sample companies implemented the ERP (ERP) or not is negative clearly; while the cross-term coefficient (ERP*State) indicating whether implementing ERP (ERP) and whether it is state-owned holding company (State) is clearly positive. the sum of the ERP coefficient and ERP * State remains negative, indicating that the agency costs of the State-Owned Enterprise implemented ERP also significantly decreased, the degree of the decrease was weakened to some extent however, which provides evidences for Han Zhaohua's findings <15> from an empirical point of view. H2 is tested thus.
For the control variables in Model 1 and Model 2, the coefficients showing the executives share holding (Inside Ratio) are clearly negative, indicating that the higher the executives share holding ratio, the lower the agency costs, which verified the conclusion that the share holding ratio of the managers is inversely changing to the agency costs between the shareholders and the managers (Jensen, 1986) . The coefficient or the proportion of independent directors (indep Ratio)
is positive, but not significant, suggesting that even through the listed companies in China introduced independent directors, and they fail to fulfill the intentions of monitoring (Sun, 2001 ).
The coefficient for the board size (director Size) is negative, but not significant, which indicates that the board size has no effect on the agency costs.
Let's examine the models with total assets turnover (Turn Over Rate) as the dependent variable. In model 3, the coefficient indicating whether the sample companies implemented the ERP (ERP) or not is positive clearly, which shows that if a listed company implemented ERP its agency efficiency will be higher, namely, the implementation of the ERP helps improve agent efficiency for the listed companies. That is, the agency costs of the listed companies reduced significantly when implemented ERP. Thus H1 is tested. In Model 4, the coefficient indicating whether the sample companies implemented the ERP (ERP) or not is positive clearly; while the cross-term coefficient (ERP*State) indicating whether implementing ERP (ERP) and whether it is state-owned holding company (State) is clearly negative, and the sum of the ERP coefficient and ERP * State remains positive, indicating that the agency costs of the State-Owned Enterprise implemented ERP also significantly decreased, the agency efficiency of such State-Owned Enterprise was weakened however, which means that the agency costs of the state-controlled listed companies decreased significantly, but the degree of the decrease is weakened. Thus H2 is tested. Notes: *** Two-tailed p<1%; ** Two-tailed p<5%; * Two-tailed p<10%
For the control variables in Model 3 and Model 4, the coefficients showing the executives share holding (Inside Ratio) are clearly positive, indicating that if the managers has more share rights, the utilization efficiency of the company's assets has significant positive correlation (Singh and Davidson,2003) . The coefficient of the proportion of independent directors (indep Ratio) is positive clearly, suggesting that the larger the independent director size, the higher the agency efficiency, which verifies that a larger board will accommodate experts from various areas and thus improve decision-making by the board of directors (Jensen, 1993 Using index CR10 instead of CR5 and after regression, the results obtained are in consistent with Table 4 .
Using the sum of squares of the shareholding ratios of the five largest shareholders instead of the CR5 index, and after regression, the results obtained are in consistent with Table 4 .
The above robustness tests show that the results in Table 4 have better robustness.
VI Research Conclusions and Limitation
Since being raised in 1976 by Jensen and Meckling, the agency problems have been widely discussed in the academic circles and the business world. Jensen and Meckling hold that the agency costs will reduce to zero when the management of an enterprise have 100% stock rights.
With the changes of the corporate ownership structures, when ownership and control are separated, the issues of incentive and constraint have become more and more prominent, and based on which Jensen and Meckling proposed the Convergence of Interest Hypothesis. The Hypothesis holds that the higher the share holding ratio of the managers, the closer the relationship between their personal wealth and the company's operation status; if the managers spending causes the loss of the company, they will also bear part of the loss, and consequently the manager's behavior will becomes more and more rational (Jensen and Meckling,1976) .Since then, there are a lot of literatures examined the impact of the agency problems on investment decisions, corporate governance structure and corporate value etc., and convincing proofs were obtained. However, with the widespread of the information technology, the existing literatures seldom study the impact of information technology on agency costs and an agency efficiency that caused by the agency problems. Through analyzing the ERP system that has been widely accepted by the enterprises, this thesis tries to find out the impact of ERP system implementation on the agency costs, to provide an empirical test for the investors and policy makers, especially for the improvement of the IT internal control mechanism. The thesis is also an indirect validation of the presence of the technology spillover effect on the micro-level (Lucas, 1988) . The study results shows that, with widespread of the information technology within companies, when examining the companies implemented ERP, it needs to consider that the company's earnings were generally poor in the first three years of implementing ERP, and three years later the company would generally get higher market returns (Hitt et al. ,2002) , and it also need to examine the agency cost problems after implementing the ERP systems. The study provides an empirical evidence for both the investors and the regulators in evaluating enterprises when they adopting new information technologies.
The limitations of the thesis is that it just studied the agency cost problems in the ERP introduction phase, which may not be necessarily universal, and the ERP implementation information is obtained through financial reports, which may exist sample bias. In addition, due to the limitations of the disclosed financial reports information, the detailed ERP module implementation status and period etc. cannot be examined, and so does the impact of ERP implementation on agency costs. Furthermore, the sample interval is too short, and it fails to examine the impact of ERP implementation on agency costs and agency efficiency in a longer time interval. These problems require further study.
